CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RETROACTIVE EFFECT GIVEN
TO MAPP V. OHIO IN COLLATERAL ATTACK OF
PRE-MAPP CONVICTION

IN TE landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio,' which barred for the
first time the introduction in state courts of evidence obtained by
unconstitutional searches and seizures, 2 the Supreme Court did not
expressly provide whether the decision was to have retroactive effect.
The problem raised by this omission has significance to the substantial number of persons convicted of crimes prior to the Mapp
decision on the basis of illegally seized evidence." The recent case
of Hall v. Warden4 presents the first instance in which a court in
meeting this question, has given retroactive effect to Mapp in a collateral attack of a pre-Mapp conviction.5
1367 U.S. 643 (1961). For general discussions of this decision see Allen, Federalism
and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Traynor,
Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319; Comment, Search and
Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CI. L. Ray.
664 (1961).
2Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), established the exclusionary rule in federal courts by holding that in a federal prosecution the fourth amendment barred the
use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure by federal officers. Whether
this exclusionary rule applied to the states was not expressly decided until Wolf v.
Colorado, S38 U.S. 25 (1949). This case held that although constitutional guarantees
.against unreasonable searches and seizures are applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, due process did not require exclusion by
-state courts of unconstitutionally seized evidence. Mapp v. Ohio overruled Wolf and
anade the exclusionary rule mandatory on the states as a matter of due process.
3Approximately two-thirds of the states admitted unconstitutionally seized evidence
-when Wolf was decided in 1949, and almost half of the states continued to do so until
Mapp was decided in 1961, including many of the most populous, e.g., New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and, until 1955, California. See Appendix to Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960); Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
33-39 (1949).
Unconstitutionally seized, or illegally seized, evidence is that which is obtained
through the "unreasonable searches and seizures" prohibited by the fourth amendment.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24. For discussions of the application of the
fourth amendment to state action through the fourteenth amendment, see generally
authorities cited note I supra.
'313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
Collateral attacks of pre-Mapp convictions should be distinguished from those
arising on direct appeal. Collateral attacks arise through habeas corpus or similar
state proceedings, while direct appeals occur through normal appellate procedure. On
direct appeal, most courts will apply Mapp on the ground that cases on appeal should
be decided on the basis of current law. For a collection of cases see Bender, The
Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 650, 680-83 (1962).
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Petitioner Hall was tried for murder in a Maryland court prior
to Mapp. At his trial, the state without objection introduced evidence obtained from a search of Hall's hotel room conducted without a search warrant. Hall was convicted, and, after exhausting his
post-conviction remedies on grounds unrelated to the introduction
of evidence, was sentenced to death. 6 Subsequent to the Mapp decision, Hall filed a petition in the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland seeking a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that illegally obtained evidence was presented at his trial,
and that this introduction violated his constitutional rights. The
district court determined that the evidence was not the product of
an illegal search, but that in any event Mapp should not be applied
retroactively. 7 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
evidence had been illegally seized s and reversed and remanded the
case to permit a new trial.
In determining whether to apply Mapp retroactively, the court
of appeals first considered the state's argument that Hall had waived
the opportunity to assert a violation of his constitutional rights by
failing to object to the admission of the evidence at his trial. The
court rejected this contention by noting that the Supreme Court
had refused many times to impose on the states a rule excluding
unconstitutionally seized evidence, and, therefore, Hall's counsel
had no reason to suspect that evidence clearly admissible under
Maryland law would later be found unconstitutional. 9
Since the Mapp decision involved the affirmation of a basic constitutional protection and did not contain any clear prohibition
against retroactive application, the court applied the principle of
consistent constitutional law10 and held that if the admission of
0 Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 162 A .2d 751 (1960); Hall v. Warden, 224 Md. 662, 168
A.2d 373, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 867 (1961).
7 Hall v. Warden, 201 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1962), rev'd, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
8 The state contended and the district court had found that by his actions Hall had
consented to the search of his hotel room, and that the search was therefore not illegal.
The two dissenting judges in the instant appeal adopted this finding on the ground
that appellate courts should not review factual determinations resting upon substantial
evidence. 313 F.2d at 497, 498 (Haynsworth and Bryan, JJ., dissenting).
o 313 F.2d at 496.
10The traditional view has been that a decision interpreting the Constitution must
be retroactive, even if it is an overruling decision, under the theory that the requirements of the Constitution have always been the same. See, e.g., Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886). Sometimes, however, especially where commercial obligations were assumed in reliance on the overruled decision, or where actions previously
thought innocent have become criminal under the new decision, courts apply the
judgment prospectively only. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
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certain evidence violates the constitutional right of due process
today, it must also have violated the same right yesterday. 1 The
court observed that a comparable problem was presented as a result
of the decision in Griffin v. Illinois,2 where the Supreme Court
found for the first time that due process required states to provide
indigent criminal defendants with free trial transcripts when a right
of appeal exists. The only mention in Griffin of whether the decision would operate retroactively was in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion, in which he urged that the case be applied
only prospectively. 13 Subsequently, however, in a collateral attack
of a twenty-three year old state conviction, 14 the Court gave Griffin
retroactive effect by directing the state to make a transcript available
to the prisoner and to consider his appeal. 15
The court next addressed itself to the argument that retroactive
application would flood courts with petitions from convicted prisoners. Summary dismissal was given this contention when the
court stated: "If such is the result of enlightened opinion, so be it.
Such fears have not deterred courts before."' 16
In previous collateral attacks of pre-Mapp convictions, the most
common reason given for denying relief has been that by not raising
objections to the introduction of illegally obtained evidence at trial
or on appeal, the prisoner has waived his opportunity to assert a
violation of his constitutional rights.17 As the court noted in the
In such cases, however, prospective application is usually expressly provided for in
the overruling decision. See generally Snyder, Retroactive Operation of Overruling
Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REv. 121 (1940); Note, 43 VA. L. Rxv. 1279, 1280-82, 1290-94
(1957).
12 313 F.2d at 495.
1-2351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1351

U.S. at 25-26.

Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
Reliance on Griffin and Eskridge as a basis for retroactive application of Mapp
has been attacked on the ground that in Eskridge, retroactive application was necessary
to minimize the risk of having convicted an innocent person. On the other hand, a
violation of the Mapp requirement does not detract from the accuracy of the conviction. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 340-41.
1

15

10

17

313 F.2d at 495.

See, e.g., Mezzatesta v. Delaware, 199 F. Supp. 494, 496 (D. Del. 1961); Johnson
v. Walker, 199 F. Supp. 86, 92 (E.D. La. 1961); Rayne v. Warden, 198 F. Supp. 552,
555 (D. Md. 1961); Petition of John T. Dirring, 183 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. 1962)
State v. Long, 71 NJ. Super. 583, 584, 177 A.2d 609, 610 (Essex County Ct. 1962);
People v. Eastman, 33 Misc. 2d 583, 228 N.Y.S.2d 156, 167 (Kings County Ct. 1962);
Commonwealth ex reL Stoner v. Myers, 199 Pa. Super. 341, 185 A.2d 806, 808 (1962).
This was also one ground advanced for the lower court's decision in the instant case.
Hall v. Warden, 201 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D. Md. 1962).
Waiver has been occasionally used by courts refusing to apply Mapp on direct
appeal. See, e.g., People v. Friola, 11 N.Y.2d 157, 182 N.E.2d 100, 101, 227 N.Y.S.2d
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instant case, however, the waiver doctrine is often discarded in exceptional circumstances, 8 and frequently is not applied where constitutional rights are involved.' 9 Furthermore, it is unrealistic to
penalize a defendant for failing to anticipate Mapp by holding him
20
responsible for not objecting to what was at the time settled law.

423, 425 (1962); Commonwealth v. Mancini, 198 Pa. Super. 642, 184 A.2d 279 (1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963).
In the recent case of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Supreme Court dealt
with the problem of waiver in federal habeas corpus reviews of state convictions.
There the petitioner was convicted in a New York court on the basis of a confession
now admitted by the state to have been obtained in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Petitioner objected to the admission of the confession at trial, but after an
adverse finding, failed to appeal. Subsequently, petitioner was denied state coram
nobis relief on the ground that in not appealing the conviction he had waived the
opportunity to assert a violation of his constitutional rights.
Petitioner then instituted federal habeas corpus proceedings in the district court,
reaching the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court determined
that his failure to appeal did not bar federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for lack of
exhaustion of state remedies, since the exhaustion requirement of § 2254 of the Judicial
Code is limited to remedies still open at the time the federal application is filed. The
Court rejected that petitioner's waiver in the state court deprived the federal system
of jurisdiction over his petition. Federal jurisdiction, reasoned the Court, is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by state
procedural rules. A forfeiture of state remedies does not legitimize the unconstitutional conviction. 372 U.S. at 426-28.
The decision thus indicates that the waiver doctrine will be very narrowly applied
when state prisoners are challenging the constitutionality of their detention through
federal habeas corpus proceedings.
18
"The verdict of a jury will not ordinarily be set aside for error not brought to
In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal
the attention of the trial court ....
cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may . . . notice errors to which no
exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously
affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United
States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159-60 (1936).
x' This is especially true where the rights involved are of great magnitude. For
instance, in Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956), petitioner,
in habeas corpus proceedings, was allowed to assert that pleas of guilty during his
trial eight years previously were coerced, despite the absence of any objection during
the trial. "[Mien incarcerated in flagrant violation of their constitutional rights have
a remedy." Id. at 123.
0Although many courts have found that in not raising objections to evidence at
trial or on appeal, parties have waived that right in later proceedings, at least one
court has gone so far as to penalize a defendant for litigating the matter in the
original proceedings. In Gaitan v. United States, 295 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962), petitioner had objected to the admission of evidence at
trial and had litigated the matter on appeal without success. The Supreme Court
decided Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), holding that evidence obtained
by state agents in an unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in a federal
court, and later Mapp v. Ohio. Thereafter, petitioner sought to vacate his sentence
on the basis of these decisions. The court denied relief on the ground that the question of admissibility of evidence was now res judicata between the petitioner and the
United States. Thus, one line of authority holds a party responsible for not objecting
to the evidence, while another punishes him if he does.
It may be questioned whether the approach in Gaitan is consistent with the
reasoning in Fay v. Noia, supra note 17.
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In addition to the doctrine of waiver, an argument for denying
retroactive application has been that the state prosecutors, at the
time of the pre-Mapp convictions, were entitled to rely on the
holding in Wolf v. Colorado21 that the fourteenth amendment did
not prohibit admission in state courts of evidence seized through
unconstitutional searches and seizures. 22 The rationale of this view
is that since state law enforcement officers acted in reliance on Wolf
and neglected to obtain sufficient evidence by legal methods to
support a conviction, they should not now, years later, be confronted
with the task of securing admissible evidence. But this reliance
seems to be irrelevant as a consideration. The prosecutors were
aware that the searches themselves were in violation of the fourteenth amendment, although the fruits of the searches were admissible at trial. State officials having willfully performed their duties
in an unconstitutional manner, the state should not now be given
special consideration at the expense of the accused.2 3 Moreover,
since there could have been no such reliance prior to Wolf, accepting this argument would lead to the incongruous result of giving
retroactive effect to Mapp in pre-Wolf convictions while denying
such application to convictions between Wolf and Mapp, including
direct appeals now before the courts.
Several courts, 24 on the basis of one footnote 25 and the use of
21338 U.S. 25 (1949).
22 See State v. Valentin, 36 N.J. 41, 174 A.2d 737 (1961); Bender, supra note 5, at

654.

3 An additional reason relied upon by appellate courts for not giving retroactive
effect to Mapp, however, is that the trial courts were also entitled to rely on what
appeared to be the law at the time. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mancini, 198 Pa.
Super. 642, 184 A.2d 279, 281 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963); Commonwealth
ex. rel. Stoner v. Myers, 199 Pa. Super. 341, 185 A.2d 806, 808 (1962). But again, such
reliance should not be a consideration, since it caused no detriment to the court.
Furthermore, neither the reliance of trial courts nor the reliance of prosecutors
would seem sufficient reason for denying federal habeas corpus remedy, under the

decision of Fay v. Noia, supra note 17.
24 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gregory v. New York, 195 F. Supp. 527, 528
(N.D.N.Y. 1961); People v. Eastman, 33 Misc. 2d 583, 228 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158-59 (Kings
County Ct. 1962).
25 "As is always the case, however, state procedural requirements governing assertion
and pursuance of direct and collateral constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions
must be respected. We note, moreover, that the class of state convictions possibly
affected by this decision is of relatively narrow compass when compared with Burns v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Pennsylvania
ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956). In those cases the same contention
was urged and later proved unfounded. In any case, further delay in reaching the
present result could have no effect other than to compound the difficulties." 367 U.S.
at 659 n.9.
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several verbs and adverbs26 in the Mapp decision have concluded
that the language of the opinion itself prohibits retroactive application.2 7 Although these sources might be construed to suggest prospectivity,2

1

the implication arising from the use of several words

and a cryptic footnote does not appear to be a sound basis for resolving a major constitutional issue. The Justices undoubtedly
were aware of the problem raised by their decision, 29 and apparently
intended to leave it unresolved. Such an inference seems reasonable,
since the suggestion that Wolf be overruled and an exclusionary
rule applied to the states was made only in an amicus brief in the
Mapp case, 30 and the court could justifiably have been hesitant to
determine the consequences of its decision without hearing argument on the point.
The policy enunciated in Mapp presents the strongest argument
for applying the decision only prospectively. Unconstitutionally
seized evidence is excluded from trial in order to protect individual
privacy from unlawful police intrusion. 31 Proponents of this argu20 "Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence illegally seized,
but a State's attorney across the street may ... ." 367 U.S. at 657 (Emphasis added.)
"If the fruits of an unconstitutional search had been inadmissible in both state
and federal courts, this inducement to evasion [the ability to use the evidence in state
prosecutions] would have been sooner eliminated." Id. at 658 (Emphasis added.)
"Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, . . . we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise." Id. at 660 (Emphasis added.)
-7But see Allen, supra note 1, at 43-45, where the author argues that the language
of the Court indicates a retroactive application should be given Mapp.
.8Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Mapp, on the other hand, indicated an assumption that the majority decision would be applied retroactively:
"[T]he issue which is now being decided may well have untoward practical ramifications respecting state cases long since disposed of in reliance on Wolf..... 367 U.S.
at 676.
20 A similar problem had been raised by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and
in Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms, 357 U.S. 214 (1958), the Court
determined that Griffin should be given retroactive application. See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra. Six of the Justices who took part in the Mapp decision also
took part in the Griffin decision, while seven participated in Eskridge.
3o See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, p. 20, Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
$'That the purpose of Mapp is not primarily to insure a fair trial but to protect
the individual's constitutional rights outside the court room is clear from the language of the decision: "Mhe second basis elaborated in Wolf in support of its failure
to enforce the exclusionary doctrine against the States was that 'other means of protection' have been afforded 'the right to privacy.' . . . The experience of California
that such other remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of other States. The obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to
the protection of other remedies has, moreover, been recognized by this Court since
Wolf." 367 U.S. at 651-53. "Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1963: 770

ment 32 urge that this purpose would not be served by retroactive

application, as the invasion of privacy has already been committed.
Furthermore, society will suffer from such application because the
convicted criminal, regardless of the source of the evidence used to
convict him, clearly did the acts with which he was charged. The
weakness of this argument, however, is that it fails to sufficiently
recognize that Mapp does not merely establish a rule of evidence
based on public policy,33 but is a constitutional affirmation that
people are deprived of their fourteenth amendment rights when
convicted by means of illegally seized evidence. Furthermore, strict
application of the policy argument would make Mapp inapplicable
to any seizures occurring before the date of that decision. Thus,
Mapp would not be applied to post-Mapp convictions where the
seizures occurred before the Mapp decision, or even to the conviction of Mrs. Mapp herself.
It is submitted that Hall presents a satisfactory solution to the
basic fear raised by the prospect of retroactive application of the
Mapp decision-the wholesale release of convicted criminals. Hall
does not open the doors of the prison, but merely reopens the doors
to the courts. After a prisoner has proven that the evidence used
against him was illegally obtained, and that he was thus deprived
of his constitutional rights, the state is given an opportunity to retry
him. 84 Although the passage of time makes it difficult for the proseguaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it."'" 367 U.S. at 656. "Thus the State, by admitting evidence unlawfully seized,
serves to encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is bound to
uphold." 367 U.S. at 657.
"Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States .. . we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise." 367 U.S. at 660.
32See Bender, supra note 5, at 660-68; Traynor, supra note 1, at 340-42.
"Prior to Mapp, California adopted the exclusionary rule in People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). Treating the new rule as a rule of evidence, the
California courts gave it retroactive application on direct appeals, but not in collateral
attacks. Traynor, supra note 1, at 339. The example set by state courts, however,
does not govern the decision to be made by courts applying Mapp, since Mapp does
not establish a procedural rule but rather a constitutional mandate.
"4This remedy will not conflict with the constitutional prohibition of double
jeopardy or with any statute of limitations. The universal rule in this country in
regard to double jeopardy is that if a defendant obtains the reversal of a conviction
by his own appeal, he may be tried again for the same offense. Most courts regard
the new trial as a second jeopardy but justify this on the ground that the petitioner
has "waived" his plea of former jeopardy by asking that the conviction be set aside.
See, e.g., Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905); Brewster v. Swope, 180 F.2d 984
(9th Cir. 1950); Annot., 97 A.L.R. 160 (1935). Neither may it be asserted that the
appropriate statute of limitations prevents a retrial, inasmuch as these statutes by
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cution to prove its case, time also makes it difficult for the prisoner
to prove the illegality of his conviction, especially since matters
relating to the source of the evidence would normally not appear
in the transcript.
Hall's answer to the retroactive problem of Mapp is consistent
with the constitutional rights enunciated in the latter decision.3 5
Hopefully, when the Supreme Court determines the application to
be given Mapp v. Ohio, its decision will be along the lines first set
forth in Hall v. Warden.
their wording cease running upon indictment for an offense, and the same indictment

may be used upon retrial.

15 A logical extension of the exclusionary rule is to also exclude evidence derivatively obtained from illegally seized evidence. This principle, known as the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine, is applied to verbal evidence as well as to the tangible
fruits of an illegal search. Thus, in Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690
(D.C. Cir. 1940), the court found that where defendant's home was entered without a
warrant, and the mere presence of the police officers induced a voluntary confession,
the confession was the fruit of illegal police tactics and therefore inadmissible. On
the basis of Nueslein, the court in Hall found it possible that a confession given
by Hall immediately upon learning that police had searched his hotel room was
induced by the illegal search. Therefore the court instructed the trial court on retrial to determine whether the search, even before the results of it were made known
to Hall, affected his power of resistance. "The psychological effect on Hall produced
by this search ... is a factor to be considered." 313 F.2d at 490.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was recently given new scope by the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

Here a confession

was induced by the illegal presence of seven policemen in defendant's home. This
confession led police to interrogate a third party who voluntarily surrendered heroin
which was subsequently introduced into evidence against defendant. The Court excluded the confession, as well as the heroin, a fruit of the illegal entry. In discussing
the application of the poisonous tree doctrine, the Court said, "We need not hold
that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have
come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question
in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.'" 371 U.S. at 487-88.

